The fact that even a system designed for the protection of personal data such as OAuth cannot be one hundred percent perfect was already demonstrated in April 2009, when a security gap was discovered in the authentication process. As with many other such systems, phishing is also a constant risk, and between April and May 2017, one million Gmail users were victims of an OAuth-based phishing attack. In a fraudulent e-mail, users were asked to authorize a fake interface to allow an alleged application called “Google Apps” access to their account information.
In October 2012, the effort of upping security from OAuth in its new model, OAuth 2 reached a final result – but without the approval of the original developers. Only OAuth2 editor-in-chief Eran Hammer-Lahav had worked on the old OAuth – and even he eventually distanced himself from the new project, three months before its release. In an article on his blog hueniverse.com from July 26, 2012, he explained the background on his decision and called OAuth 2.0 "way to hell" in the headline.
What happened? According to Hammer-Lahav, the development of the new protocol had been determined by constant debates between the developers and the companies involved (including Yahoo!, Google, Twitter, and Deutsche Bank). At some point, issues were ignored in favor of economic interests. The consequence would be a program which, according to Hammer-Lahav, could no longer be described as secure. Instead of representing a precise standardized protocol, OAuth2 is at most a framework that can be adapted and extended at will.
One more thing Hammer-Lahav regrets is the fact that the decision was made to implement OAuth 2.0 more easily (for example by omitting signatures), which leads to a lack of security. In order to program a secure application that supports OAuth2, developers would need to have a considerable amount of expertise. It is therefore more likely that insecure applications will accumulate on the network in the future. Implementation errors are unavoidable, given the incomplete and excessively complex specifications, says Hammer-Lahav.
Hammer-Lahav was somewhat correct in his concerns. In 2016, a research group at University of Trier had to deal with the security of OAuth2 and discovered two security gaps. One of them allowed man-in-the-middle attacks. Basically, however, the researchers considered the protocol to be relatively safe – provided it was implemented correctly.